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A Constitutional Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Restrictions Upon
Marriage
At every stage in the development of a people are found cer-
tain standards of living that fix the terms upon which men are
willing to endure a given order. As long as society meets these
terms they are willing to go peaceably about their business, but if
these terms are not met and their fundamental habits of living and
acting are interfered with, they rebel and demand their rights.
What these fundamental rights are is not determined by human
nature in abstract, but by the custom and expectations of a given
age and people.'
I. Introduction
In Loving v. Virginia,2 the Supreme Court struck down a Vir-
ginia miscegenation statute3 because it was both racially discrimina-
tory' and an unacceptable infringement upon the right to marry. 5
That decision engendered much speculation6 on whether the right to
marry is fundamental,7 requiring special protection by the United
1. N. WILDE, The Ethical Basis of the Modern State 83 (1954).
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-57, 20-58, 20-59 (1960). The statute prohibited marriage be-
tweeik any white person and any "colored" person, declared such marriages void, and imposed
a prison sentence of not less than one or more than five years. §§ 20-50 to 20-60 were repealed
in 1968.
4. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
5. Id at 12.
6. After the Loving decision, commentators differed on whether there was an independ-
ent fundamental "right to marry." Although Loving was the only case that dealt specifically
with the right to marry, a racial classification, which itself calls for strict scrutiny, was an
important element in the decision. Thus, the determinative element in the case was unclear.
See note 8 infra, for cases dealing incidentally with marriage. See Foster, Marriage.A '"asic
Civil Right of Man, "37 FoRDHAM L. REV. 51 (1968); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1974). See also Drinan, The Loving Decision
and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO STATE L.J. 358, 364 (1968); Glendon, Marriage and the
State: The *Hthering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976).
7. The fundamental rights concept has become nebular in recent years because of the
Court's continued expansion of certain rights protected under, yet not enumerated in, the Con-
stitution. Thus, a conclusive definition cannot be given. See note 50 and accompanying text
infra. Among other rights, the Court has held that procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942)), criminal procedure rights (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)), voting
(Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)), and marriage constitute funda-
mental rights. See Note, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1127-30 & nn.19-22 (1969); Comment, Fun-
damental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cl. L. REv. 807
(1973).
In addition to the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of fundamental rights, further
States Constitution. Cases prior to Loving provided support for the
proposition that the right to marry is fundamental, but those deci-
sions did not give a definitive answer.s Finally, in Zablocki v.
Redhail,9 the Court specifically addressed the question in reviewing
a Wisconsin statute' that prohibited the issuance of a marriage li-
cense unless all prior marital support obligations were current or any
delinquencies justified to the court."I The Court invalidated the
statute by an eight to one decision,'
2 though only five Justices' 3
agreed that the right to marry was a fundamental right.
14
controversy has arisen over the specific classification of marriage. Marriage may be consid-
ered either a basic human right or a privilege extended by the state. See Hohfeld, Some Fun-
damental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). In
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), Mr. Justice Stewart classifies it as a privilege.
8. The cases noted by the Court do not deal specifically with whether the "right to
marry" is itself a fundamental right. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,205 (1888), which dealt
only with divorce, the Court not only considered marriage as "creating the most important
relation in life," but also declared that it "has always been subject to the control of the legisla-
ture." (Emphasis added). Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), dealt with the right to
"establish a home and bring up children," id at 399, but the Court confused the issue by
continuing, "and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common-law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id (emphasis added). In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court was addressing the right of procreation, not mar-
riage; and in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the issue was the right to receive
contraceptives, whether married or not.
9. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
10. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 245.10(1),(4),(5) (West Supp. 1977).
11. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.10(4) (West Supp. 1977), provides in pertinent part:
(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as stated
in sub. (1), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain
permission of the court under sub.(l), except that in a hearing ordered or held by the
court, the other party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in another state, need
not be present at the hearing. If such other party is not present at the hearing, the
judge shall within 5 days send a copy of the order of permission to marry, stating the
obligations of support, to such party not present.
The statute also imposed criminal penalties for violations of the statute, Wts. STAT. ANN §
245.30()(f) (1973). See State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N.W.2d 414 (1969) (upholding
criminal prosecution for failure to comply with § 245.10), and declared void all marriages
entered into without compliance with the statute.
12. Only Mr. Justice Rehnquist viewed the statute as a valid exercise of the state's right
to regulate marriage. The Court declared, "Since our past decisions make clear that the right
to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state
interests advanced in support of the classification is required." 434 U.S. at 383 (emphasis
added). But cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the majority
observed that the area of domestic relations has long been an area that is virtually the exclu-
sive province of the states).
13. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun joined. Justice Burger also filed a concurring
opinion, but he did not abandon the position that marriage is a fundamental right.
14. Three of the four remaining Justices voiced strong opposition to the idea that mar-
riage is a fundamental right. Mr. Justice Stewart rejected the notion of a constitutionally
fundamental "right to marry" in favor of the view that there is merely a privilege to marry.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978). Mr. Justice Powell classified marriage as a
"'fundamental freedom', more akin to a privilege than a right, over which the state has tradi-
tionally been granted the power to regulate." Id at 398. Mr. Justice Stevens distinguished
"marital status" from the "right to marry," and implied that classifications based upon the
former would require a lesser degree of scrutiny than the latter, but that the latter is still
subject to "evenhanded regulation" even if it does "interfere directly and substantially" with
the right to marry. Id at 404. Finally, Mr. Justice Rehnquist agreed with Mr. Justice Powell
Thus, Zablocki has settled the issue for the present. The major-
ity expressly declared that the right to marry is fundamental and is
protected by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 5 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that state legislative re-
strictions upon this fundamental right will not exact the same degree
of judicial scrutiny that the Court applies when reviewing statutory
restrictions upon other recognized fundamental rights. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Marshall said,
[W]e do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which re-
lates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary,
reasonable regulations that do not signficantly interfere with the
decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed.1
6
Therefore, it is implicit that deference will be given to the traditional
role played by the state in regulating marriage,' 7 despite the funda-
mental nature of the right.
The concept of marriage-the manner in which a man and wo-
man cohabit with society's sanction-has changed tremendously in
the United States during the past century. Formal marriages have
diminished in importance becoming less permanent, and individuals
have more freedom to ignore social convention.' 8 This evaluation is
evidenced by the changing attitude of the Supreme Court toward the
that marriage is a fundamental freedom which is, nonetheless, subject to state regulation. Id
at 691.
Prior to Zablock, the right to marry was probably not considered fundamental. Given
the digressive treatment of the right to marry in prior decisions, supra note 8, and the division
among the members of the Court in Zablocki, this proposition seems justified.
15. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. Id at 681 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977) (upheld provisions of the Social Security Act that denied benefits to permanently dis-
abled individual when that individual marries someone who is not entitled to receive benefits
under the Act); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upheld a state statute that required one
year of residency before an individual could initiate a divorce action); Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190 (1888).
18. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Court upheld a statute of the
Territory of Utah prohibiting the practice of polygamy, reaffirming the right of society to re-
strict, even prohibit, certain marriages that "have always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe." Id at 164. Although polygamy is still prohibited, the state's
power to control marriage was relaxed in the aftermath of World War II when there was a
rapid increase in marital breakups, resulting in increased stress upon marriage and divorce
laws. (Mr. Justice Jackson recognized the confusion and uneven application of marriage laws
in his dissenting opinion in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 680 (1949).) In Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968), the Court prohibited the granting of legal benefits on the basis of marital status
by invalidating a state statute that discriminated against illegitimates. Subsequent cases con-
firm the view of the Court that marriage can no longer mandate preference when a legal au-
thority deals with personal rights. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1965) (contraceptives
could not be made available to married women yet be illegal for single women); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to have an abortion cannot be denied to an unmarried woman). In
essence, the Court, which originally gave active support to societal marriage restrictions, will
no longer permit society to grant legal benefits solely on the basis of marriage. See Noonan,
The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255 (1973); see also note 20 infra
laws affecting marriage.' 9 In light of this change the question arises
to what degree may society, via the state, encroach upon this per-
sonal freedom?20 This comment will attempt to answer that ques-
tion by defining the limits beyond which state statutes regulating
marriage may not transgress. The framework used to test a statute,
as delineated by the Court in Zablocki, will be analyzed, and se-
lected Pennsylvania statutes2' that regulate marriage will be scruti-
nized in an attempt to determine their constitutionality.
II. State Power to Regulate Marriage
State regulation of marriage22 may extend further than state
regulation of other fundamental rights because of the origin of the
state's right to regulate marriage. 2a  Like their Parliamentary coun-
terpart, the state legislators in America had the authority to create,
modify and repeal marriage laws24 as part of the state's police power.
The founding fathers realized that each state needed power to pro-
tect its citizens and preserve the order of society.25 Thus, the states
were granted the police power, founded upon and justified by the
19. For example, legal benefits that were once bestowed upon individuals married "in
the eyes of the law" and denied to those not so situated have been greatly reduced. New
Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (welfare benefits could not
be extended to married persons with children born in wedlock or legally adopted but denied to
persons not married or with illegitimate children); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976) (property rights given to meritricious spouse upon dissolution of
relationship); In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973) (judicial recognition
of illicit cohabitation). In Cary, the California Supreme Court held only that legal contracts
to live together could exist if sexual relations were not bargained for in the contract. The
court did not accept or condone the relationship; it merely recognized that living together
without being married does not make the contract illegal or void.
20. Although personal lifestyle freedoms are not specifically granted in the Constitution,
the Court's recent interpretation of that document indicates that these freedoms are subsumed
within the spirit of the Constitution. This view is consistent with the Court's traditional role
in developing the rights of individuals and determining the power of the state to regulate those
rights. Furthermore, some writers feel that the right to choose a lifestyle is as important as the
freedom of speech, press, and religion. Wilkinson & White, Consitutional Proection for Per-
sonal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 563 (1977).
21. The Pennsylvania statutes that will be scrutinized are PA. STAT. ANN. 48 §§ I-
5(b),(c),(d),(i) and 169 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
22. The term "marriage" has been used to refer both to the act of becoming married and
to the status of being husband and wife. 52 AM. JUR. 2d MARR1AGE § 1(1970). Generally, it
includes both common-law and ceremonial marriages.
23. Although the common-law origin of the state's right to regulate marriage is unset-
fled, it is generally agreed that when the American colonies were established, the English ec-
clesiastical courts claimed exclusive jurisdiction over marital law and applied the canon law as
developed by the Anglican Church. See Engdahl, MedievalMetaphysics andEnglissh Marriage
Law, 8 FAm. L. 381 (1968); W. HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621 (1931); E.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 364 (2d ed. 1909).
24. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 191, 206 (1888), the Court noted that in this country,
the "legislative assemblies of the Colonies followed the example of Parliament" and treated
divorce specifically, and marriage law generally, as being within the state's province.
25. This power was not derived from any constitution, but rather from a grant by the
people to the government to act as their agent. Police powers are actually regarded as re-
served powers, although they resemble granted powers. 16 AM. JUR. 2d CONSTITurrIONAL
LAW § 260 (1976).
notion of public necessity26 and restricted to promoting and protect-
ing the general health, safety, welfare and morals.27 To preserve the
American ideal of maintaining maximum individual freedom in re-
lation to the government, however, two general restraints were
placed upon this power. First, the power must operate to benefit the
general public and, second, it must proscribe private conduct only to
avoid a public harm or bestow a public benefit.28 These restraints
necessarily imply a balancing of the infringement on the private
right with the public benefit derived from the infringement.29
As early as 1858, the United States Supreme Court indicated
that the regulation of marriage and divorce was under the exclusive
control of the state,30 subject only to a very limited constitutional
scrutiny. This position was subsequently reiterated by the Court,3'
and in the so-called Mormon Cases32 the Court established the
state's right to interfere directly and substantially with the individ-
ual's right to marry by upholding legislation that forbade the prac-
tice of polygamy.33 Not until the Skinner v. Oklahoma34 and Loving
v. Virginia35 decisions did the Court increase the constitutional scru-
tiny applicable to state marriage regulations and undermine the con-
cept of exclusive state control. Since those decisions, the permissible
degree of state regulation on the right to marry has continued to de-
crease36 to the present level spelled out in Zablocki
26. Lamson, The Right to Decide - Individual Liberty Versus State Police Powers, 18
ARIz. L. REV. 207, 208 (1976).
27. Id at 207. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659 (1887).
28. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY, 20 (1963). See generally, A. MCLAUGH-
LIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 91-105 (1935); B. MITCHELL & L.
MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 47-61 (1964); C.
PA1rrIERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 49-54 (1967).
29. Lamson, supra note 26, at 208.
30. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858). In that case, the Court declared, "We disclaim
altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for
the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to
divorce a viniculo, or due from bed and board." Id at 584. But cf. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (the Court ruled that the right to receive a divorce was fundamental and
could not be unduly regulated or prohibited by the state).
31. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714(1877). In Pennoyer the Court stated, "The State, for
example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation be-
tween its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved." Id at
734-35. And in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court recognized marriage as one of
the most important relations in life, which is, as it always had been, under the control of the
legislature.
32. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
33. Although the legislation was territorial in nature because Utah was not yet a state,
the statute had the same legal effect as if enacted by a state.
34. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l.,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)(states' right to establish minimum
domicile requirements in divorce proceedings upheld).
III. The Zablocki Test
A. Fundamental Rights Anaysis
After declaring that the right to marry was a fundamental right
as determined by prior decisions37 and protected by the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment,38 the Zablocki Court
found that the Wisconsin statutory classifications significantly inter-
fered with the right to marry.3 9 Therefore, the state interests ad-
vanced in support of the classifications required "critical
examination."'  In undertaking this "critical examination" the
Court applied the fundamental right analysis4' recently enunciated
in Trimble v. Gordon.42 This test requires stricter scrutiny than the
traditional rational relationship test,43 but one that is less exacting
than the strictest scrutiny" applied to classifications based upon sus-
37. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). In Zablocki the Court stated that after Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), courts have routinely
considered the right to marry as a personal decision protected by the right to privacy. Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
38. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). Prior to Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the
Court used the doctrine of substantive due process to determine the constitutionality of state
regulations that infringed upon fundamental rights. In Ferguson, however, Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the Court, announced, "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies, who are elected to pass laws." 372 U.S. at 730 (footnotes omitted). Only two years
later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court adopted a very similar posi-
tion under the guise of equal protection analysis. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259
(1970), Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, stated,
The "equal protection" analysis of the Court is, I submit, a "wolf in sheep's cloth-
ing," for that rationale is no more than a masquerade of a supposedly objective stan-
dard for subjective judicial judgment as to what state legislation offends notions of
"fundamental fairness." Under the rubric of "equal protection" this Court has in
recent times effectively substituted its own "enlightened" social philosophy for that of
the legislature no less than did in the older days the judicial adherents of the now
discredited doctrine of "substantive due process."
This view is reiterated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Zablocki questioned the use of
equal protection analysis because the classification did not deny equal protection of the law.
Instead, he contended that the classifications were an "unwarranted encroachment upon a
constitutionally protected freedom." 434 U.S. at 391-392.
40. Id at 679. See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
41. Fielding, Fundamental Personal Rights. Another Approach To Equal Protection, 40 U.
CHI. L. Rav. 807 (1973); Gunther, Foreword, In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rv. 1 (1972).
42. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Although this analysis was not clearly expressed by the Court
prior to Trimble, it was apparent in their rationale as early as Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
43. The rational relationship test apparently originated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911). In that case the Court held that a state statute was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest if any state of facts could be reasonably conceived that
would sustain a finding of a relationship. Given this broad definition, virtually all state stat-
utes could meet the test.
44. Strictest scrutiny is a euphemism employed by the Court for 'Judicial legislation."
It requires the statute to be reasonably calculated to achieve the state's designated interests and
the "best" alternative, if several exist.
Prior to Trimble, strictest scrutiny was applied in "suspect class" and fundamental right
cases largely as a two-tier equal protection test, rather than a "balancing-sliding scale" ap-
pect classes.45
Essentially, the fundamental right analysis employed in
Zablocki entails the "balancing" of the following four elements: the
nature of the individual's right being regulated;4 6 the reasonableness
and degree of the regulation;47 the nature of the state's interest being
promoted;48 and the quality of the tailoring of the statute to prevent
unnecessary infringement upon the individual's right.49 The weight
to be given each element may vary according to the element's rela-
tive importance.
The first variable, the nature of the individual's interest, neces-
sarily refers to whether a fundamental right is concerned, a determi-
nation that has long been the subject of debate.5 0 A definitive list of
fundamental rights does not exist, nor is it probable that such a com-
pilation can be made. Rather, the Court has declared that funda-
mental rights are an evolving concept and one must look to the
"traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine
whether a principle is "so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fun-
damental."'" Thus, the inquiry is whether the right can be infringed
or denied without violating the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice.
5 2
proach. In Trimble, however, the Court reiterated its holding in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495 (1976) that illegitimacy was not a suspect class, and even though the statute infringed upon
a fundamental right, strictest scrutiny would not apply. 430 U.S. at 767. A "stricter," but not
the "strictest" scrutiny was applied to fundamental rights. Thus, the rationale indicated that
the Court was applying a test with more than two-tiers, a test that fluctuated with the particu-
lar state and individual interests involved.
45. In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), the Court defined a
.suspect class" as one, "saddled with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritorian political process." The Court has found
examples of suspect classes in various cases. Loving v. Virginia, 381 U.S. i (1967) (racial
discrimination); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (alienage). But cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977) (Court upheld a statute that favored immigration of alien legitimate children and alien
illegitimate children with their natural mother, but not illegitimate alien children with their
natural father); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Court upheld a "benign" classification
that bestowed benefits on widows that were unavailable to widowers).
46. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
47. Id at 386.
48. Id at 388.
49. Id
50. Whether the list of rights in the Bill of Rights necessarily precludes other rights from
being considered as fundamental has been a basis for contention since the drafting of the
Constitution. Both James Madison and, later, Mr. Justice Story expressed grave concern over
the implication that only those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights should be protected, but
those not listed would be denied.
51. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
52. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). The rights assured by the letter or pen-
umbra of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring), is necessarily included in any definition.
The second element of the fundamental right analysis applied in
Zablocki contains two distinct inquiries. First, one must decide
whether the regulation is reasonable in nature. 3 If the regulation is
not reasonable, it will fail without need for the second inquiry. Al-
though the Court did not define what is reasonable,54 one can infer
that the restriction must at least be rationally related to effecting the
state's interest. 5 Second, the degree of restriction upon the individ-
ual's right must be evaluated by considering the nature of the indi-
vidual's interest and the nature of the state's interest. If, for
example, the degree of regulation is not substantial, the infringement
is permissible even though it restricts a fundamental right.56 Should
this restriction be substantial, however, further evaluation will be re-
quired under the third element of the fundamental rights analysis,
the nature of the state's interest.57
An evaluation of the nature of the state's interest requires a de-
termination of whether this interest is compelling, for if it is compel-
ling, a substantial degree of regulation upon the individual's right
will be permitted. 58 The same difficulty encountered in determining
whether a right is fundamental 9 is also encountered in deciding
whether a state's interest is compelling. The traditional interests ad-
vanced by the states to justify marital restrictions, which have been
viewed as compelling in nature,' include promoting public moral-
ity, ensuring family stability, assuring payment of support obliga-
tions and providing for the needs of young children.6'
The last element that must be considered in the analysis is the
quality of the tailoring of the statute.62 Proper tailoring requires
that the restriction infringe upon an individual's fundamental right
only to the degree necessary to effectuate the putative state interest.63
This aspect of the analysis is controversial and has caused much dis-
sension within the Court.' In Trimble v. Gordon,65 the Court ob-
53. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
54. Id at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. The Court did not reveal any additional requirements that may be needed.
56. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
57. Id at 388.
58. Id
59. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra
60. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
61. See Weitzman, supra note 6, at 1242.
62. "Tailoring of the statute" is phraseology used in equal protection analysis that is
analogous to the due process usage of an irrebutable presumption. See generally Note, The
Irrebutable Preaumption Doctrine of the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974). In
both concepts, the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the statute are considered in
detail to determine if the state purpose can be achieved with fewer restrictions upon the indi-
vidual.
63. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Tailor-
ing of the statute is perhaps the most critical exercise. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).
64. Mr. Justice Rehnquist has consistently dissented when the Court has used the over-
served, ,"The judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating
constitutional rights without interfering unduly with the State's pri-
mary responsibility in this area. 66 Thus, a narrow and often illu-
sory line exists between the concepts of tailoring a statute, a valid
exercise of judicial discretion, and judicial legislation, an impermis-
sible judicial activity.67
B. Application of the Fundamental Analysis
In Zablocki, the majority inferred that the Wisconsin statute
68
was a reasonable regulation,69 but held that the legislation substan-
tially interfered with the fundamental right to marry. Thus, absent
a compelling state interest, the statute could not sustain challenge.
Although the Court did not question Wisconsin's assertion that two
compelling interests were served by the statute,7° the Court found
that the statute was overinclusive because the goals of the state could
be attained with much less infringement on the fundamental right to
marry than the statute imposed.7' Since a compelling state interest
and proper tailoring of the statute are required, the overbroad re-
strictions in the statute caused it to fail.72
C. A4 Statute Can Completely Prohibit A Fundamental Right And
Still Survive Constitutional Scrutiny
Under the Zablocki analysis, "reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital rela-
tionship may be legitimately imposed. ' 73  Therefore, complete
prohibitions would be constitutionally impermissible, even if reason-
able in nature. Mr. Justice Stewart offered a more likely interpreta-
tion, however, when he observed, "Surely, for example, a State may
legitimately say that no one can marry his or her sibling, that no one
inclusiveness and underinclusiveness rationales to abrogate statutes, declaring it unjustified
judicial legislation. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 407 (1978); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977); Jimnez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 638 (1974); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972).
65. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
66. Id at 771.
67. The Court is cognizant of this precarious situation and, consequently, is very selec-
tive in its tailoring exercise. When fundamental rights are being regulated, however, the
Court has exercised the tailoring concept to its fullest.
68. WIS. STAT. § 245.10 (1973).
69. Although the Court never specifically stated that the regulation was reasonable, the
additional analyses of whether it was a substantial impediment, whether there was a compel-
ling state interest, and whether the statute was properly tailored would have been superfluous
if the Court had concluded the regulation was not reasonable.
70. These interests were the fulfillment of prior support obligations and the welfare of
the children born of the second marriage. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id at 386 (emphasis added).
can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry
without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no
one can marry who has a living husband or wife."74  Thus, a com-
plete prohibition of the right to marry may withstand constitutional
attack in a very selected group of cases, if the prohibition is reason-
able and a valid compelling state interest is evident.
IV. Pennsylvania's Restrictions on the Issuance of a Marriage
License
A4. General Requirements
Pennsylvania law recognizes two types of marriages, ceremo-
nial" and common-law.76 The elements that are essential to the va-
lidity of both are legal capacity,7 7 present intent to marry,78 and
effective consent of both parties.79  Without these elements the mar-
riage is void ab inftio,s0 rather than voidable.8' Statutes regulating
marriages are also of two basic types-those that determine whether
the individuals have the requisite capacity to marry,82 and those that
define the procedural requirements that must be met before a valid
marriage license will issue.8 3 Since Pennsylvania is one of the
twenty states that recognize common-law marriages as valid, s4 the
74. Id at 684 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. A "ceremonial" marriage is performed by a religious or civil authority with the cus-
tomary formalities and requires no cohabitation for validation. Zanifino's Estate, 375 Pa. 501,
100 A.2d 60(1953). An invalid ceremonial marriage does not preclude the existence of a valid
common-law marriage if all the prerequisites exist for the latter.
76. A common-law marriage does not require a solemnization before officers of a church
or the state if effective consent, present intent, and present capacity to enter into the marriage
contract exist. Although they are valid in Pennsylvania, Warrenberger v. Folsom, 140 F.
Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa.), afd, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956), common-law marriages are merely
tolerated, not encouraged. In re Stevenson's Estate, 272 Pa. 291 116 A. 162, (1922).
77. Morton v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Pa. 1950). See also I A. FREEDMAN,
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA 13 (2d ed. 1957). Individuals with ca-
pacity, as used in this context, include those who are mentally competent, of legal age, not
intoxicated or under influence of narcotic drug, and under no other personal incapacities.
78. In re McGrath's Estate, 319 Pa. 309, 179 A. 599 (1935); In re Rosenberger Estate,
362 Pa. 153, 65 A.2d 377 (1949); see also A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 14.
79. Commonwealth v. Gamble, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 146, 150 (1908). See also A. FREED-
MAN, supra note 77, at 13.
80. A void marriage is never valid and may be attacked directly or collaterally without
obtaining a judicial decree. A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 12. Five categories of marriages
are considered absolutely void in Pennsylvania: bigamous marriages, marriages in which one
party was insane at the time of the marriage, marriages in which one of the parties is under the
age of seven, and marriages in which one party lacks intent or is under a personal incapacity.
Jewett v. Jewett, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 175 A.2d 141 (1961).
81. A voidable marriage is valid until annulled by a judicial decree. It may not be
attacked collaterally after the death of one of the parties. These marriages are made valid
until successfully attacked to prevent the offspring from being illegitimate. A. FREEDMAN,
mpra note 77, at 13.
82. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
83. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5(b), (Purdon 1965), and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§§ l-5(c)(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
84. The following state and district statutes have provisions recognizing common-law
marriages allegedly formed within the state: A.A. CODE tit. 34, § 9 (1973); COLO. REV. STAT.
restrictions that apply only to ceremonial marriages do not pose the
same impediment in exercising the right to marry as they do in the
states that do not permit common-law marriages. Those restrictions
in Pennsylvania that affect the capacity of an individual to enter a
valid ceremonial marriage, however, create the same degree of inter-
ference as in the states that do not recognize common-law marriages.
B. Age Requirements
To obtain a marriage license in Pennsylvania without the con-
sent of a third party, section 1-5(c) of the Marriage Law of 195385
requires that both parties be at least eighteen years of age. Other-
wise, consent of a parent or guardian is required, 6 which must be
acknowledged by two witnesses.8 7 If a minor has no parent or
guardian, the court will appoint one.88 In addition, section 1-5(b) 89
of the act requires that anyone under the age of sixteen shall be de-
14-2-110 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 126 (1974); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 30-101(4) (West 1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (West 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §53.101 (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE §
32-201 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.11 (West 1977); KAN. STAT. § 23.101 (1974);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 206, 207, § 47 (West 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-13 (1973);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-130 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457-39 (1968); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 13 (McKinney 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Baldwin 1971);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § I (West 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-23 (Purdon 1969); R.D.
GEN. LAWS § 15-2-1 (1977); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.91 (Vernon Supp. 1978); and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5147 (1968).
The statutes of those states that do not recognize common-law marriages are as follows:
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.061 (1977); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 111 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
55-101 (1971); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4100 (West Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-3
(West 1958); HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 4 (1971); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-6-1 (Burns Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Baldwin 1973); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 88 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19, § 121 (Supp. 1977); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. art. 62, § 4 (1974); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 25.2 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.01 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (Vernon 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. §
42.104 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.010 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 1-10 (West Supp.
1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-10 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (Supp. 1977); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1971); Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.150 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-21 (1962); S.
D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-405 (1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. 30 § 1-2 (1976); VA. CODE § 20-13 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26-04.140 (1961);
W. VA. CODE § 48-1-5 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.12 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 20-1-101
(1977).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977) provides as follows:
(c) If either of the applicants is under the age of eighteen years, unless the con-
sent of a parent or guardian of said applicant shall be personally given before the
clerk, or be certified under the hand of a parent or guardian, attested by two adult
witnesses, and, in the latter case, the signature of the parent or guardian shall be
acknowledged before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgements. When
any such minor has no guardian, and a judge of the orphans' court is absent or not
accessible for any reason, the clerk of the orphans' court, or a duly appointed assis-
tant clerk of said court, may appoint for such minor a guardian pro hac vice.
86. If the parent or guardian will not give consent, the judge of the orphans' court can, if
good cause is shown, order the issuance of a license. In re Minors Application for Marriage
License, 65 Pa. D. & C. 337 (C.P. Phila. 1949).
87. See note 85 supra.
88. Id
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(b) (Purdon 1965) provides that no license shall issue,
"If either of the applicants for a license is under the age of sixteen years, unless a judge of the
nied a marriage license unless the judge of the orphans' court decides
that issuance of a license would be in the best interests of the appli-
cant.90
Age requirements have a long history in marriage law. At com-
monlaw a marriage was voidable if the male was under the age of
fourteen or the female under the age of twelve, 91 and these restric-
tions still apply to common-law marriages in Pennsylvania.92 Statu-
tory restrictions regulating the age at which one may obtain a valid
marriage license create different legal ages for ceremonial marriages.
Apparently, the age differences for the two types of marriages repre-
sent that which society prefers and that which it permits. In effect,
these statutes make a nonconforming ceremonial marriage voidable,
although they do not preclude the individual from entering into a
valid common-law marriage, assuming the presence of all the re-
maining necessary elements.
The Pennsylvania age requirements appear to be consonant
with the Zablocki test. The restrictions are reasonable because they
are temporary and apply to everyone in the age groups. 3 Whether
these age restrictions constitute a substantial interference with the
right to marry depends upon the particular view adopted. Obvi-
ously, the restriction is an absolute prohibition to those individuals
who have not yet attained the requisite age and, therefore, could be
considered a substantial interference. A view could be taken, how-
ever, that the right to marry is one that has not yet become vested in
individuals too young to appreciate the right. Nevertheless, under
either view the age restriction appears valid because compelling state
interests offset any substantial interference with the right to marry.
The prevention of the ill effects upon the individuals involved in
youthful marriages and the resulting higher incidence of divorce are
compelling interests,94 and coupled with an acceptably tailored stat-
ute,95 they fulfill the final requirements of the test used in Zablocki
orphans' court shall decide that it is to the best interest of such applicant, and shall authorize
the clerk of the orphans' court to issue the license."
90. Id
91. A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 29.
92. Id If the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, the distinction between males and
females is likely to be declared unconstitutional, unless it can be supported on some basis other
than sex.
93. Wilkinson & White, ContitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLifesyles, 62 CORNELL L.
Rv. 563, 569-70 (1977).
94. Id
95. While the age limit appears arbitrary, some limit must be set to protect young people
from entering into marriage contracts that create undue hardships upon the couple and society.
Until recently, required age for contractual capacity for contracts other than marriage was
twenty-one. Presently, the required age is eighteen.
C Restrictions Dealing with Mental Incompetence
Section 1-5(d) of the Marriage Law of 195396 prohibits the issu-
ance of a marriage license
[i]f either of the applicants for a license is weak-minded, insane, of
unsound mind, or is under guardianship as a person of unsound
mind unless a judge of the orphans' court shall decide that it is for
the best interests of such applicant and the general public to issue
the license, and shall authorize the clerk of the orphans' court to
issue the license.
97
Although the statute appears precise enough to permit effective im-
plementation, this facade disappears upon close examination. In-
deed, a strong argument can be propounded that the statute is
unconstitutional.
Under the Zablocki test the restriction in section 1-5(d) seems
both reasonable and rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Unlike the age classification, however, this restriction obviously con-
stitutes a substantial interference with the right to marry since the
restriction is not temporary, but a continuing prohibition based upon
status. Therefore, to withstand constitutional attack, the statutory
constraint must be based on compelling state interests and must be
closely tailored to effect only those interests.98
Generally, the states assert the following interests to justify this
type of statutory regulation: the protection of a spouse from entering
into a marriage contract with one who is mentally incompetent; the
protection of the incompetent individual from being exploited; and
the prevention of procreation by an individual incapable of being a
fit parent or by one whose condition is hereditary. 99 These interests
were recognized as compelling in Buck v. Bell, to in which the Court
upheld a state statute' 0 ' that permitted sterilization of mentally in-
sane inmates at the discretion of the state. Nevertheless, the Buck
holding, though not specifically overruled, was severely weakened in
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 102 In that case, the Court found a statute,
which was similar to the one in Buck, unconstitutional under the
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
97. Id
98. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
99. See Lazero, Mental Incompetency as Grounds for Annulment, 7 J. FAM. L. 442, 442-
56 (1967).
At common law the marriages of incompetents were regulated to protect the mentally
disabled and to benefit society by preventing the propagation of the weak minded. Note, 15 J.
FAM. L. 463, 465 (1976-77); see also Lazero, supra note 99. This trend is relatively recent,
however, for in Biblical times mentally incompetent individuals were permitted to marry al-
though they were not expected to have children. Incompetents were forbidden only to be
witnesses in legal proceedings or parties to a contract. Note, 15 J. FAM. L. 463, 465 (1976-77).
100. 274 U.S. 200,207 (1927). But cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invali-
dating an Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of certain criminals).
101. Virginia Sterilization Act of 1934, ch. 394 (1924).
102. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
equal protection clause as an unwarranted infringement upon a fun-
damental right-the right of procreation. Thus, the nature of the
states' interests as compelling is, at least, questionable in light of
Skinner.
In addition, two major problems are encountered when the tai-
loring requirement of the Zablocki test is applied to the statute.
First, the categories of individuals described are vague and inaccu-
rate. The terms "weak-minded," "insane," and "of unsound mind"
are archaic and fail to impart the distinctions identified by modem
psychological techniques.'03 Second, although the statute estab-
lishes certain classifications, it fails to provide a procedure to estab-
lish an applicant's incompetency. The successful implementation of
the statute depends upon either the applicant's desire to conform to
the law" or a mental defect that is obvious to the official taking the
marriage license application. As a result, uniform administration of
the statute is impossible.
Furthermore, a comparison of section 1-5(b)0 5 and 1-5(d)"°
reveals that the criteria considered by the judge before ordering a
license to issue in exceptional cases are more stringent for an incom-
petent than for a minor.0 7 Although these different burdens repre-
sent the legislative judgment that a marriage involving a mentally
incompetent individual is more detrimental to society than a mar-
riage between minors, no justification for the difference has been
given.
Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute, while eliminating some of the harsh and unjust results
caused by the restriction, does not make the statute constitutional. 0 8
Still present in the statute are the unclear descriptions of classes of
individuals upon which the presumption of incompetency is based.
Hence, individuals capable of an intelligent understanding of the
marriage contract and relationship may still be denied the right to
marry if the individual is erroneously deemed incompetent. Pre-
103. Note, 15 J. FAM. L. 463, 465 (1976-77).
104. Relying on this desire is unrealistic since a truly mentally incompetent person will
not analyze the results of his actions.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(b) (Purdon 1965).
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
107. Under section 1-5(b) of the Marriage Law of 1953, the judge can grant a marriage
license to a minor if the judge is convinced it would be in the best interests of the minor. In
section 1-5(d) of that law, however, the judge must consider not only the applicant's best inter-
ests, but also the effect the marriage will have on society. Although an applicant's burden to
obtain a license under section 1-5(d) is greater than his burden under section 1-5(b), the differ-
ence is unexplained.
108. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "mere weakness of mind and pecu-
larities of conduct will not invalidate a marriage," Nonnemacker v. Nonnemacker, 159 Pa.
634, 637, 28 A. 439, 441 (1894). Rather, a showing that this condition prevented the individual
from having an intelligent understanding of the marriage contract and relationship is required.
Id; see a/o Herr v. Herr, 109 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 165 A. 547 (1933).
sumptions that are normally permissible to expedite and economize
the judicial process are constitutionally unacceptable when applied
to fundamental rights."°'
Thus, as section 1-5(d) of the Marriage Law of 1953' 0 is pres-
ently written, its constitutionality may be questioned. It sweeps too
broadly in its classifications, presuming all of the individuals so clas-
sified are mentally incompetent when that may not be true. To
avoid being overbroad, the statute could be improved by defining its
classifications more narrowly. For example, if mental incompetents
who have hereditary deficiencies, but who are incapable of produc-
ing offspring are permitted to marry, the same restrictive ends could
be reached while affecting the rights of fewer persons. Likewise, a
statute could merely prohibit the marriage of incompetents who are
incapable of rearing children. Finally, if incompetents who are ca-
pable of giving voluntary consent or who are able to understand the
nature and obligations of marriage are permitted to marry,"' the
enunciated interests of the state would be protected without infring-
ing the fundamental right to marry.
D. Restrictions Based Upon Familial Relationships
The present statute in Pennsylvania that restricts the issuance of
a marriage license to parties based upon their relationship to one
another, section 1-5(i) of the Marriage Law of 1953,' 1 is founded
109. Note, 15 J. Fre. L. 463, 478 (1976-77).
110. PA. STAT. ANN.. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
111. Lazero, supra note 102, at 453.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (Purdon 1965) provides the prohibited degrees of
consanguinity and affinity as follows:
Degrees of Consanguinity
A man may not marry his mother.
A man may not marry his father's sister.
A man may not marry his mother's sister.
A man may not marry his sister.
A man may not marry his daughter.
A man may not marry the daughter of his son or daughter.
A man may not marry his first cousin.
A woman may not marry her father.
A woman may not marry her father's brother.
A woman may not marry her mother's brother.
A woman may not marry her brother.
A woman may not marry her son.
A woman may not marry the son of her son or daughter.
A woman may not marry her first cousin.
Degrees of Affinity
A man may not marry his father's wife.
A man may not marry his son's wife.
A man may not marry his wife's daughter.
A man may not marry the daughter of his wife's son or daughter.
A woman may not marry her mother's husband.
A woman may not marry her daughter's husband.
A woman may not marry her husband's son.
A woman may not marry the son of her husband's son or daughter.
upon the canonical impediments derived from the Book of Leviti-
cus." '3 These restrictions are of two types. Restrictions based upon
degrees of consanguinity refer to blood relationships, and restrictions
based upon degrees of affinity refer to relationships through mar-
riage.
At common law, incestuous marriages-prohibited marriages
between certain related individuals-were considered voidable. ' 4
The reasons advanced to justify these restrictions were as follows: to
maintain the Divine Law forbidding the marriage of close rela-
tives," 15 to preserve and strengthen the physical qualities of society
by preventing inbreeding (the eugenic argument), and to maintain
the sanctity of the home by preventing the disasterous effects that
accompany familial competition for sexual companionship." 16
The court in In re Enderle Marriage License"l7 advanced these
reasons as justification for similar restrictions created by Penn-
sylvania statutes. Nevertheless, the court's interpretation contains a
defect, for while all the reasons are valid with respect to the restric-
tions based upon degrees of consanguinity, the familial peace argu-
ment is considerably weakened and the eugenic argument is
inapplicable when used to justify restrictions based upon degrees of
affinity. Thus, each restriction must be analyzed separately.
L Restrictions Based Upon Degrees of Consanguinity.-The in-
terests advanced by the Commonwealth for prohibiting marriages
between close blood relatives-the preservation of the Divine Law,
the prevention of the serious side effects of inbreeding, and the pres-
ervation of familial peace,-appear valid today, and these interests
may be furthered by the enforcement of the restriction. This as-
sumption is premised upon scientific data indicating that offspring of
these marriages have serious congenital problems. 1I8 These restric-
tions do, however, create a substantial barrier to the exercise of the
right to marry. The restriction is not temporary, but a permanent
prohibition imposed upon adult individuals in whom this fundamen-
tal right has vested. Thus, for the Commonwealth to deprive indi-
viduals of that right the state must show a compelling interest and a
close tailoring of the restriction." 9 Since the promotion and preser-
vation of the general health, safety, welfare, and morals is the basis
113. Leviticus 18:6-18; A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 404.
114. A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 409; see also Note, 17 IOWA L. REv. 254 (1932).
115. A. FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at 403.
116. In re Enderle Marriage License, I Pa. D. & C.2d 114, 120 (C.P. Phila. 1954).
117. Id
118. Moore, A Defense of First-Cousin Mfarriage, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 136, 146
(1961).
119. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
for the state's police power, 120 and the putative interests of the Com-
monwealth fall squarely within three 12 1 of those areas, the regulation
may serve compelling interests. Nevertheless, the restraint must be
as slight as possible since the fundamental right to marry is in-
fringed.
While the justifications advanced by the Commonwealth have
merit for restrictions on closer degrees of consanguinity, these argu-
ments weaken 22 when extended to first cousin marriages. 23 In Scho-
field v. Schofield"24 the court upheld the validity of a Delaware
marriage between residents of Pennsylvania who were first cousins.
The marriage was prohibited in Pennsylvania, but valid in Dela-
ware. In upholding the marriage and calling it voidable rather than
void, the court reasoned that, "where a state forbids a marriage be-
tween certain persons, or classes of persons, merely upon the ground
of expediency and not upon moral grounds, or such as would tend to
outrage the principles and feelings of all civilized nations, the gen-
eral rule as to validity of foreign marriages prevails."' 125  In a more
recent case, In re Enderle Marriage License,126 the court ordered the
issuance of a marriage license to applicants who were first cousins by
adoption. The court held that the Marriage Law of August 22,
1953127 prohibited only marriages of natural first cousins, and there-
fore, the legislature did not intend the restriction to apply to first
cousins by adoption. Evidently, the Pennsylvania courts are not
convinced that the justifications advanced for these restrictions are
valid when applied to all first cousin marriages.
21
Another deficiency in the statute 129 is its failure to address rela-
tion by adoption. Although the court in In re Enderle Marriage
License130 reasoned that the restriction applied only to natural first
cousins, the court declared that it was not determining the law for
relationships closer than first cousins. 13' The rationale of Enderle
was not extended in In re Applicationfor Marriage License of MEW
120. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
121. These three areas are health, welfare, and morals. Although one could argue that
safety of the Commonwealth's citizens would be affected since fewer domestic quarrels would
result, this effect is speculative.
122. As the probability that recessive genes will pair to cause congenital defects becomes
insignificant, the eugenic argument loses much of its validity, especially when compared to the
restrictions imposed.
123. See Moore, note 118 supra at 146.
124. 51 pa. Super. Ct. 564 (1912).
125. Id at 575 (emphasis added).
126. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 114 (C.P. Phila. 1954).
127. Pub. L. No. 383, 1953 PA. LAws 1344.
128. See note 118 supra
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (Purdon 1965).
130. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 114 (C.P. Phila. 1954).
131. Id at 121.
and MLB, '32 in which an adopted brother and sister who were both
adults and who had never lived in the same family unit were denied
a marriage license.
Thus, with the exception of the restrictions placed upon first
cousin marriages, the restrictions of marriage based upon degrees of
consanguinity appear able to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the statute'33 could be improved by closely tailoring it
so that only those first cousin marriages that would thwart the fulfill-
ment of the Commonwealth's interests are restricted.
2. Restrictions Based Upon Degrees of Affinity. - Analysis of
restrictions based upon degrees of affinity indicates that these re-
straints are less reasonable than restrictions based on consanguinity.
Although the Commonwealth's interests remain valid, a rational re-
lationship does not exist between the goals reflecting these interests
and the effect of the restriction. The restrictions, even if effective,
will not produce the results needed to fulfill the Commonwealth's
putative goals. The eugenic argument does not apply to this type of
restriction because there is no blood relationship and little chance of
serious side effects in the offspring. In addition, the familial peace
argument loses much of its validity since these individuals do not
have the same close ties that exist in the nuclear family. Further-
more, the duration of the marriage relation in contemporary society
need not be lifelong, in contrast to earlier canonical impediments.
Finally, the preservation of the Divine Law is not a valid state inter-
est since it is not reflective of the morals espoused by today's soci-
ety.'" Thus, without at least a rational basis, the reasonableness
requirement of Zablocki cannot be met.'
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute does fulfill the reasonable-
ness requirement, the compelling interest requiremexnt for the restric-
tion could be satisfied. 36  The interests advanced by the
Commonwealth for the restrictions based upon relationships by con-
sanguinity 37 are also applicable to restrictions based upon relation-
ship by affinity and are equally compelling. To avoid unnecessary
infringement upon the right to marry, however, the restriction could
be more closely tailored. For example, the same problem caused by
relationships by adoption that was encountered in the consanguinity
restrictions also adheres in affinity restrictions. Moreover, a rational
132. 125 Pitt. LU. 151 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1977).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (Purdon 1965).
134. Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of llicit Cohabitation, 25 HASTINGS L.
Rlv. 1226 (1974); see also Taintor, Marriage to a Paramour after Divorce: The Conflict of
Laws,, 43 MiN. L. REv. 889, 892 (1959).
135. See note 152 infra.
136. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
137. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra
relationship between the fulfillment of the Commonwealth's interests
and the restriction is not as readily apparent in the affinity restric-
tions as it is in the consanguinity restrictions. Therefore, the ra-
tional relationship probably does not extend to all of the restricted
relationships 38 listed in the statute.
39
V. Pennsylvania's Anomaly in Marriage Law
Chapter four of the Marriage Law of 1953,14 entitled "Miscel-
laneous Provisions," contains an ignominious restriction, which is
unique to Pennsylvania, on the right to marry.' 4 ' Section 169 of
Pennsylvania Statutes annotated 42 provides that a party who is di-
vorced on the grounds of adultery is prohibited absolutely from mar-
rying the correspondent named in the adultery charge during the
lifetime of the former spouse. Section 1-5(h) 43 of the Pennsylvania
law forbids the issuance of a marriage license to parties so situated
and prevents them from consummating a valid ceremonial mar-
riage.'" Thus, any type of marriage between the two parties is pre-
cluded.'
45
This remarkable restriction apparently originated from the oath
of calumny, an eighteenth century Scottish oath."4 The oath was
adopted in Pennsylvania in the divorce laws enacted in 1785147 and
1815148 and is presently authorized by the Marriage Law of 197 1.
49
The rationale "justifying" the restriction is twofold. First, the law
protects the injured and presumably innocent spouse's mental well-
being by forbidding the two guilty parties from living together in a
legal union. This prohibition supposedly assuages the hurt caused
the former spouse and prevents him or her from being forced to en-
dure the shame of watching the guilty parties live under the auspices
of legal marriage."5° Second, the restraint prevents the community's
morals from being offended by the cohabitation. 5'
138. See note 112 supra
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (Purdon 1965).
140. Pub. L. No. 383, 1953 PA. LAWS 1344.
141. In 1957, Louisiana, New York, Tennessee and Virginia had similar statutes, see In
re Mayall's Naturalization, 154 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1957), but since that time all those
states have repealed the legislation.
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon 1965).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(h) (Purdon 1965).
144. Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir. 1956).
145. Id
146. Garrat v. Garrat, 4 Yeates 243 (Pa. 1805).
147. ActofSept. 19, 1785, ch. 1187,§7.
148. Act of 1815, P.L. 150, tit. 48, PA. STAT. ANN. § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
149. Pub. L. No. 16, 1971 PA. LAWS 174.
150. Taintor, supra note 134, at 892; see also Brown, Pennsylvania Common Law Mar-
riage and Annulment. Present Law and Proposalsfor Aorm, 15 VILL. L. REv. 134 (1969).
151. See Taintor, supra note 134, at 892.
The crucial test set forth in Zablocki to analyze the "paramour
marriage" restrictions is that of reasonableness, which requires a
valid state interest that is protected by a restriction to which the in-
terest is rationally related.'52 Even though the first justification may
contain a scintilla of truth, in effect, the restriction is a tool for the
injured spouse to obtain an unfair settlement by agreeing not to sue
for divorce on any other ground than the ground of adultery.'53 In
this respect, the restriction encourages vindictiveness and creates ad-
ditional turmoil in an already emotional proceeding. Moreover, the
second justification appears to lack any validity today. At one time
the justification may have reflected the mores of society and fur-
thered a valid interest of the Commonwealth. Today, however, this
is not true.' Although adultery is still ground for divorce in thirty-
two states,15 5 only Pennsylvania' 56 has this penalty for adulterous
divorces.
The present unreasonableness of the restriction is further indi-
cated by the courts' recent interpretations that attempt to avoid the
harsh consequences of the restriction. In In re Mayal's Naturaliza-
tion, ' 57 a woman who was married in violation of section 169 was
denied an application for citizenship to the United States because
she was not of "good moral character."' 5 8 because she was married
in violation of section 169. The court held that although section 169
was applicable to divorces outside Pennsylvania's jurisdiction,5 9
good moral character embodies more than being lawfully married.
Since only four states out of forty-eight had similar statutes,1
60
Mayall's marriage was not immoral to the average citizen of the
community if the United States was the relevant "community." In
the more recent case of In re Estate of Lenherr16 the court held that
152. The Court has not specifically defined what is or is not reasonable. See note 69
supra. It is implicit, however, that, at minimum, a regulation is reasonable if it has a rational
relationship to a validstate interest, although more than the minimum could be required in any
given situation.
153. Henninger, Proposals for Changes in the Pennsylvania Law ofDivorce, 61 DICK. L.
REV. 359 (1957).
154. Comment, supra note 134, at 1226. The 1970 census revealed that in the last ten
years, the number of people living together without being married has increased ten times. See
also Foster, Marriage."A 'Basic Civil Right ofMan," 37 FORDHAM L. Rav. 51 (1968); Drinan,
The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 358 (1968).
155. The states that still maintain adultery as a ground for divorce are Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi.
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Note, 81 DICK. L. REV.
722, 729 n.48 (1977).
156. See note 141 supra.
157. 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
158. Id at 560.
159. Id
160. Id
161. 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974).
even though section 169 was applicable and the marriage at issue
was void, the petitioner should be granted a marital deduction as
"wife" for inheritance tax purposes. The desirability of having uni-
form results in marital status 62 outweighed the policy considerations
behind the statute.1
63
Undoubtedly, the statute and its subsequent interpretations con-
stitute a substantial impediment to the exercise of the "right to
marry" or, as posited by one writer, the "right to marry one's
choice."'" In In re Stulls Estate, 165 an early case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania declared that the inability of the two parties
to marry was a "personal incapacity." The court stated,
The necessary meaning of this language is that they shall not mar-
ry at all, in any circumstances, or at any time, or any place, so
long as the injured party is living. So far as the purpose and
meaning of this statute are concerned it is of no consequence
where such subsequent prohibited marriage takes place.
166
Although the court nominally based this holding on two earlier En-
glish cases, 67 neither of those cases supports the broad statements
made in the Stull decision. 16 Nevertheless, the restriction has been
162. The court adopted the rationale given in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 283, comment 1 (1971), which states in pertinent part,
If the prohibition was directed against one party alone, such as when the guilty party
is forbidden to marry his paramour, the courts of the divorce state would be moti-
vated in part by the notion that such prohibition should be strictly construed since it
is in the nature of a penalty. But even when the prohibition cannot properly be
considered a penalty, such as when it prohibits both parties from remarrying and is
intended to protect the institution of marriage by deterring quick remarriages, the
courts of the divorce state would rarely apply their local rule to invalidate an out-of-
state remarriage by one of the parties that was contracted within the forbidden time.
These courts would rarely apply their rule, because they usually would find that the
policy embodied in the rule is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the general policy
which favors upholding the validity of marriages.
163. In re Estate of Lenherr, 455 Pa. 225, 230, 314 A.2d 255, 259 (1974).
164. Drinan, supra note 154, at 360.
165. 183 Pa. 625, 39 A. 16 (1898).
166. Id at 629, 39 A. at 18 (emphasis added).
167. Sussex Peerage Case, (8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844); Brook v. Brook, 11 Eng. Rep. 703
(1861).
168. In Sussex Peerage, the Royal Marriage Act, 12 Geo. 3, c. 11, prohibited the dece-
dents of King George II from contracting a marriage without the previous consent of his Maj-
esty, his heirs, or his successors as signified under the Great Seal and declared in council. Any
marriage without prior approval was void. Prince Augusta Frederick married Lady Augusta
Murray in Rome in 1793 without consent. The court held that, absent the Royal Marriage
Act, the marriage would have been valid, but that the Act established a personal incapacity
upon the Royalty. (In Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244 (1889), the court applied the same
rationale, but failed to recognize that the Royal Marriage Act was predicated upon the special
relationship between the Royalty and the British Empire. Since no equivalent special rela-
tionship existed between the State and Pennegar, the personal incapacity holding was un-
founded. The Stull decision, which was based on Pennegar, was likewise erroneous.)
In the second case, Brook v. Brook, I I Eng. Rep. 703 (1861), the concept of marital domi-
cile was at issue. The court held that the laws of the marital domicile, not the present domicile
of the parties or the state in which the ceremony takes place, determine the validity of the
marriage. Marital domicile was defined as the place where the parties intended to be domi-
ciled after the marriage ceremony took place. The Stull decision indicates that even if the
marriage is valid in the matrimonial domicile, the present domicile, and the state in which the
used to declare marriages void when a divorce on the ground of
adultery was granted in another jurisdiction,169 when parties have
been married in a jurisdiction that has no restriction and they have
returned, 70 and even when the parties are domiciled in another state
that has no restriction.' 7 ' In the Stull decision the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared three exceptions to the general rule that a
marriage that is valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. 7 2 The
court will not recognize a marriage, even though valid where cele-
brated, when the marriage is contra bonos mores, when the marriage
is contrary to public policy, and when there is a specific positive stat-
ute against particular marriages in the jurisdiction where enforce-
ment is sought.'73 Although some decisions have mitigated the
harsh results of the Stull court's reasoning,' 74 other decisions have
followed that reasoning despite its intolerable conclusion.
75
Since the interests advanced by the Commonwealth to support
this restriction no longer exist,' 76 there is no need to determine
whether the interests are compelling. Even if one assumes that the
interests do exist and are compelling, the restriction will not pass the
tailoring requirement set forth in Zablocki As presently interpreted,
the restriction is an absolute bar to marriage as long as the former
spouse lives. 77 Assuming remarriage of an adulterer would not of-
fend public morality, the only remaining Commonwealth interest is
the protection of the former spouse's mental wellbeing. Yet this
statute makes no provision for the former spouse to permit a subse-
quent marriage if it is not offensive to his or her mental wellbeing.
Nor is there provision for the court to remove the prohibition. The
restriction is an absolute personal incapacity. Regardless of whether
the injured spouse moved to another jurisdiction or the guilty parties
married in a secluded part of Pennsylvania, they would not be con-
marriage takes place, if the parties move to Pennsylvania, the marriage would be void. That
interpretation, however, is not supported by the cases cited as authority.
169. Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950); In re Mayal's Naturaliza-
tion, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P.
Susq. 1945).
170. In re Estate of Lenherr 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974); In re Stull's Estate, 183
Pa. 625, 39 A. 16 (1898); In re Immendorf's Estate, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 268 (1898); Kline v.
Kline, 43 York 114 (C.P. Lehigh 1929).
171. Aronson v. Connor, 6 Lack. 43 (Pa. C.P. 1905).
172. See note 162 supra
173. In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 A. 16 (1898).
174. In re Estate of Lenherr, 455 Pa. 225, 314 A.2d 255 (1974); In re Mayall's Naturali-
zation, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
175. Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956); Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa.
Super. Ct. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948).
176. Taintor, spra note 134; Brown, supra note 150; Drinan, supra note 154.
177. One might argue that this restriction is an incentive to commit murder. This possi-
bility is enhanced because the emotional atmosphere that accompanies these situations is not
conducive to making rational decisions, especially if the innocent spouse is attempting to use
the restriction to his or her advantage in obtaining a more favorable property settlement. In
addition, there is no restriction that prevents a convicted murderer from marrying.
sidered husband and wife under present Pennsylvania law. Thus,
enactment of this widesweeping statute to further untenable Com-
monwealth interests is overinclusive. In addition, when the injured
spouse cannot prove adultery or does not sue for divorce on that
ground the restriction does not apply, although the spouse's mental
wellbeing may be injured just as severely and the moral sense of the
community affronted to the same degree. The statute is, therefore,
both underinclusive and overinclusive;178 the restriction severely re-
stricts the fundamental right to marry and the provisions of the stat-
ute are inadequately tailored.
Prior to the Zablocki case, several writers had called for the re-
vision 179 or repeal'80 of section 169 of the Marriage Law of 1953.181
Since 1970, Louisiana, New York, Tennessee, and Virginia have re-
pealed similar statutes.'8 2  The argument that these laws do not af-
fect a significant number of persons does not lessen the extreme
hardships placed upon those few who are affected,"8 3 nor does that
178. See note 62 supra.
179. Taintor, supra note 134, at 898.
180. Brown, supra note 150, at 146; Henninger, Proposalsfor Changes in the Pennsylvania
Law ofDivorce, 61 DIcK. L. REv. 359 (1957). Perhaps the strongest call for repeal was voiced
in Foster, Marriage." A "Basic Civil Right ofMan," 37 FoRDHAM L. REv. 51 (1968), which
stated,
What social good is accomplished by the penalty other than condemnation of sin and
soothing the hurt pride of the presumably virtuous but cuckholded spouse, justifica-
tion is difficult to find. It comes close to irrationality to assume that paramour acts
deter adultery. . . . It may well be the Supreme Court would find paramour acts
unconstitutional as not being necessary to accomplishment of any permissible state
objective or as not employing rational or reasonable means of achieving same.
Id at 70.
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
182. Louisiana repealed LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West), in 1972; New York re-
pealed DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 8 (1964), in 1977; Tennessee repealed TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-831 in 1970; and Virginia repealed VA. CODE § 20-119 Domestic Relations, in 1975.
183. In 1956, for example, a "widow" and child were denied Social Security benefits
because the mother's common-law marriage was considered invalid under section 169 of the
Marriage Law of 1953. Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956). In the recent
case of Chlystek v. Kane, 540 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), a "wife" was denied Social Security
benefits while her "husband" was living and death benefits when he died; her marriage was
declared void under section 169.
Although the relative number of persons actually affected by the statute appears insignifi-
cant, the absolute number of persons affected or potentially affected by this statute is large.
The following is a chart of the number of divorces granted on the ground of adultery in Penn-
sylvania during the past five years-







Pennsylvania Department of Health, Pennsylvania Marriage and Divorce Statistics, Special Re-
ports 22-26 (1972-76).
The report indicates that, assuming a correspondent is named in every case, as is required
contention make the law constitutional.
VI. Conclusion
An analysis of Pennsylvania statutes'84 that regulate the right to
marry shows that they cluster in three categories of probable consti-
tutional validity. In the first category are sections 1-5(b) and (c),
85
the restrictions based upon age. They are constitutional because
they operate as "reasonable regulations that do not significantly in-
terfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship."' 86
Section 1-5(d),'87 which deals with restrictions based upon
mental competency, and section 1-5(i),' 88 which deals with restric-
tions based upon the relationship of the parties to one another, are
questionably constitutional. These sections do not appear to meet
the close tailoring requirement set forth in Zablocki In addition, the
affinity restrictions of section 1-5(i) 8 9 may be unreasonably restric-
tive. Although the Commonwealth has valid compelling interests in
regulating the marriage relation, the arguments made to show that
these particular regulations will further those interests are uncon-
vincing.
Finally, section 16911 ° is undoubtedly unconstitutional for three
independent reasons. First, one may question whether the interests
that the Commonwealth alleges need protection still maintain con-
temporary validity. Second, even if these interests are valid, they do
not appear to be clearly compelling-a necessity when regulating a
fundamental right. Last, the statute could be more narrowly drafted
to infringe upon the right to marry of fewer individuals, while still
furthering the interests espoused by the Commonwealth. Thus, it is
doubtful that section 1691'9 could withstand a constitutional assault
under the Zablocki analysis.
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by Young v. Young, 29 Erie 265 (Pa. C. P. 1946), 412 individuals over the past five years could
be affected by this unconstitutional statute.
184. See note 21 supra.
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